Extend the $23.15M qualifying offer by ≈ Nov 5. Expect him to decline: his market estimate ($30.8M a year for 3 years) beats the offer by $7.6M a year, and 12 of 14 comparable deals cleared it (86%); at the low end of his range ($21.8M a year) he could accept. If he declines, take the pick (about $8.6M net of his bonus); second base then goes to Nick Gonzales. Don't re-sign him above $13.5M a year under today's rules; his market estimate is $30.8M.

Decided together with “Spend to the floor” and “Fix third base”; all read the same Winter Plan.

A clear lean: his chance of accepting is about 14% (80% range 6%–30%; 2 of last winter's 14 comparable deals came in below the offer), far enough below the 58% break-even that extending clears the $1.8M toss-up line even at the top of that range (+$4.1M). On the owners' proposed terms it pays either way with the floor money free and holds at face value. The risk is the accept branch: that year is worth −$6.4M under today's rules.

Protect Termarr Johnson (2B, AAA, FV 45), Derek Diamond (SIRP, AAA, FV 40) and Keiner Delgado (SS, AA, FV 40) by Nov 17. Expose the rest; the most likely to be taken is Cy Nielson (AAA, risk 0.23; expected loss 0.03 long-term WAR, below the 0.06 that cutting Noah Murdock for a fourth spot would cost; the plan's rule protects at most three).

Decided together with “Tender or non-tender, and the third catcher” and “Fix third base”; all read the same Winter Plan.

A clear lean: each protected player's expected loss if exposed is larger than the spot he takes. The pick risks are ordered, not calibrated, and a lockout could cancel the draft's major-league phase.

Tender everyone except Henry Davis: shop him first, and if nothing comes, release him by Nov 17: the plan's three Rule 5 protections, filed Nov 17, need his spot, and the non-tender deadline (Nov 20) falls after the filing. First line up the third catcher: re-sign Christian Bethancourt to a minor-league deal, before ≈ Nov 5. On the owners' proposed terms the call flips only if the floor money has no other use (tender Henry Davis, decide in spring: +$2.6M); at face value re-signing Christian Bethancourt still holds (+$372K, against −$400K for tendering and deciding in spring).

Decided together with “Rule 5 protection” and “2027 ABS challenge policy”; all read the same Winter Plan.

A judgment call: 5 options sit within 0.2 wins' worth ($1.8M) of the best under today's rules; the pick is the best of them on value and needs no 40-man spot. Every other arbitration player's value covers his salary.

Don't sign the list before Dec 1 at today's prices. Under today's rules none of it clears the market price of a win (0.81 wins per $10M against 1.11), and the three would cost $38.2M a year, $4.1M over the gap. No other use the plan measures clears it either: the best use not already in the plan, Jack Flaherty, mid-tier starter, buys 0.98 wins per $10M. If the new CBA sets the owners' floor, spend the $34.0M gap on short deals then: on their terms Jake Bauers, Jack Flaherty and Alex Vesia cost $33.6M a year and the whole list adds +3.1 wins, taking the plan from 81.7 to 84.8 wins and 56% playoff odds.

Decided together with “Qualifying offer: Brandon Lowe” and “Mitch Keller: keep, trade, or add a starter”; all read the same Winter Plan.

A clear lean on price: at today's prices the same money buys 1.1 more wins at the market rate than the list does, beyond the 0.2-win line. Waiting risks little: the Board's next lists add about the same. The floor itself is a proposal, and the owners'-terms prices are Keystone's assumption.

Acquire Isaac Paredes (HOU) for Jacob Gonzalez and Jhostynxon Garcia once Houston exercises his $13.35M option (≈ Nov 1–5), and close before Dec 1: +2.6 wins, taking the plan to 81.7 (80% range 70–94) and 44% playoff odds, for $12.6M of 2027 payroll and $16.4M of prospect value. His value is the bat; his glove rates below Jared Triolo's. On price alone the trade is short of the market price of a win (0.90 wins per $10M against 1.11); the case is that nothing else gets its wins: the next option without a draft-pick cost adds 1.0 fewer. He is under control only through 2027: third base reopens for 2028.

Decided together with “Qualifying offer: Brandon Lowe” and “Rule 5 protection”; all read the same Winter Plan.

A clear lean: he adds 1.0 wins more than the next realistic option without a draft-pick cost. The risks: his surplus is −$1.9M under today's rules (+$8.1M with the floor money free, −$5.2M at face value on the owners' proposed terms), and his glove at third reads differently by the two fielding measures.

Keep him for now, medicals first; revisit once he is cleared (he ended 2026 on the 60-day IL). Under today's rules the trade saves $13.3M in 2027 dollars against 1.2 wins over 2027–2028 worth $10.9M: net $2.4M for trading, but a club gains from the terms only if his medicals are clean. With the floor money spent either way (the Free-Agent Board's list measured on each branch, on the owners' proposed terms), keeping him comes to 84.8 wins and trading him 85.0, a toss-up. Adding a mid-tier starter, Jack Flaherty, adds +1.0 to +1.1 wins: his price doesn't beat the market price of a win, so it waits with the floor money.

Decided together with “Spend to the floor” and “2027 starter hook and bullpen roles”; all read the same Winter Plan.

No clear lean between keeping and trading him: under today's rules the money leans to trading once his medicals clear, and with the floor money spent the two come out within 0.2 wins. The real risk is health: if he and Jones both miss the season the plan loses 2.9 wins.

Stage it. By mid-November: medical and biomechanics review of the four-seam velocity drop and the arm-angle change (the club's medical data; Keystone has none). If the cause is benign, offer up to $22.6M a year for 5 years before Dec 1, when the CBA expires. If not, go year to year and reopen if his four-seamer averages 97.5 mph or more by May 2027.

Decided together with “2027 starter hook and bullpen roles”; both read the same Winter Plan.

A judgment call: the gap between the market price and our walk-away is smaller than the price model's typical miss, and a velocity haircut flips it.

Rotation (Winter Plan): Paul Skenes, Jared Jones, Braxton Ashcraft, Bubba Chandler and Mitch Keller. Two times through for Mitch Keller once his medicals clear. Let Braxton Ashcraft face the order a third time (a toss-up). Let Paul Skenes face it too, pending the review of his velocity drop. Jared Jones: a 22-batter leash (about 81 pitches) after his arm injury, not an open third time; past it, decide by matchup (a toss-up). Give Bubba Chandler development innings on a 22-batter leash (about 82 pitches), once through the top of the order a third time, at about 1.0 ± 1.2 runs against a two-times-through hook (a toss-up); the goal is first two passes at .306 xwOBA or better, not a third-time skill, pending the review of his velocity drop. Ladder: Mason Montgomery and Yohan Ramírez in the late innings (within noise of each other); Evan Sisk and Luke Weaver setting up (within noise of each other). Move Evan Sisk into the leverage ladder. Move Isaac Mattson out of it.

Decided together with “Mitch Keller: keep, trade, or add a starter” and “Extension: Paul Skenes”; all read the same Winter Plan.

The league step is stable every season and leverage is well measured. The per-pitcher calls rest on 2026 with 2024–25 at half weight, and a starter's own penalty barely repeats (r = 0.07). Mitch Keller's call holds only if he is healthy.

Keep challenging as the staff does now, with the break-even card as the written rule so the old grid isn't used: catchers own the defensive challenges; challenge a call when you're at least as sure as its count's break-even: 6%–32% with both challenges left before the 7th, 13%–53% with the last one before the 7th, 3%–17% from the 7th inning on. Early in the game, batters with the last challenge hold 0-0 and 0-1 through the 2nd and 1-1 through the 1st, unless the call is clear. No green lists. Against how clubs already challenge, the card is a toss-up (≈0 runs a season, 80% range −0.04 to +0.05, inside the plan's 1.9-run toss-up line). It would have held back none of Pittsburgh's 196 second-half challenges. Don't go back to the old count grid: in the forward test it cost about 9.4 runs per club a season, late-game exception included.

Decided together with “Tender or non-tender, and the third catcher”; both read the same Winter Plan.

No clear lean on the card itself: against how clubs already challenge, its forward-tested 80% range (−0.04 to +0.05 runs a season) sits inside the plan's 1.9-run toss-up line, so adopting it is a judgment call. The clear part is the old grid: it lost 9.4 runs per club a season in the forward test, 8.9 even at the good end of its range. The test scores 5,227 second-half challenges on rules fit before Jul 1.