Player development / Draft Value
Player development / Draft Value

What is a pick worth, and where does draft money go furthest?

What a draft pick is worth, measured from what 3,840 picks in the 2005–2016 drafts actually became. The top of the draft is where stars come from; in the pool era, picks after #75 return 1.38 control WAR per $1M of slot against 0.70 for the first 75. The same curve prices Pittsburgh’s 2027 picks and the one it would get back if Brandon Lowe declines the qualifying offer.
For scouting director, general manager Model card Drafts 2005–2016 · FanGraphs WAR through 2026 · 2026 slot values
Pittsburgh’s 2027 first-rounder (≈ #17) $11.7M Net of a $4.9M bonus (2026 slot) · $13M–$20M before it, 90% band
Lowe’s compensation pick, net of its bonus $8.6M If he signs elsewhere for $50M+ (≈ #29–34) · $5.2M if under (≈ #75)
Pittsburgh 2026 pool used 99.6% $16.2M of a $16.2M pool, incl. $150K of a later-round bonus above the $150K exemption
Best buy per pool dollar No clear winner Pool era: every band from #76 on overlaps within two standard errors

Pittsburgh’s 2027 draft capital

What the 2026 standings and the qualifying offer set up; what isn’t known yet is listed, not guessed

Pick≈ #Value (90% band)Slot (2026)Net of bonusOutcomes there
Round 182–80 in 2026, the 17th-worst record among the 18 clubs that missed the playoffs; #18 if AZ (a better record) wins a lottery pick17 (18)$16.6M$13M–$20M$4.9M$11.7Mmedian 0.2 WAR, 45% at or below zero
Lowe compensation (he signs for $50M+)Only if he declines the qualifying offer and signs elsewhere (current CBA, Keystone's reading).29–34$11.6M$9M–$15M$3.0M$8.6Mmedian 0.0 WAR, 52% at or below zero
Lowe compensation (he signs for under $50M)Only if he declines the qualifying offer and signs elsewhere (current CBA, Keystone's reading).70–80$6.3M$5M–$8M$1.1M$5.2Mmedian 0.0 WAR, 65% at or below zero
Round 2About #54: 30 first-round picks, then the compensation and Competitive Balance A picks between rounds (7 of them in 2026), then his place in the order; the 2027 count isn't set yet.54$7.6M$1.8M$5.8M

Pittsburgh drew lottery picks in 2025 (#6) and 2026 (#5); under the current CBA (Keystone's reading) a revenue-sharing club can't win a lottery pick three years running, so by that rule it would sit out the 2027 lottery (treating Pittsburgh as a revenue-sharing club, an assumption: revenue-sharing status isn't in our data). With the second-best record among the 18 clubs that missed the playoffs, its lottery chance would be small either way: the lottery weights the worst records most. Value is the present value of his six control seasons net of their salaries; net of bonus subtracts the 2026 slot at that pick.

Signing another club’s qualifying-offer free agent would cost Pittsburgh its third-highest pick: about $5.8M net of the bonus it would no longer pay ($4.0M–$9.3M as the pick falls between #29 and #92). The third-highest pick is #54 if Lowe declines and signs for $50M+ and no Competitive Balance pick lands (the central figure); as early as #29–37 if Lowe declines and signs for $50M+ and a Competitive Balance A pick lands; as late as #92 if Lowe accepts and no Competitive Balance pick lands. A player traded during 2026 can't receive a qualifying offer, so signing him costs no pick.

Not known yet: Competitive Balance picks for 2027 (Pittsburgh made one in 2023, 2024 and 2025 by our draft data; eligibility and round A or B are set by a formula we don't have); the exact order after Round 1 (compensation and Competitive Balance picks); 2027 slot values and bonus pool (published in the spring; 2026 slots shown as a guide); the new CBA: it could change compensation picks and the draft itself (the owners' proposal also replaces the international bonus pools with an international draft).

The Lowe ledger

Where the compensation pick fits in the qualifying-offer decision (Winter Plan and decisions feed)

Plan: extend the offer. He is 86% likely to decline (12 of 14 comparable deals cleared the offer last winter); extending pays if he declines with probability above 42% (owners’ terms: above 48% at face value, at any odds if floor money is free). Re-signing him after a decline: his market estimate ($30.8M a year) is above the ceiling: let him go.

If he declines and signs elsewhere$8.6Mcompensation pick, net of its bonus (the low end of his price range is $65M in total, above $50M)
If he accepts+1.8 wins44% → 51% playoff odds, $22.4M more payroll; Gonzales goes to the bench
Re-signing him after a decline ≤ $13.5M a year for 3 years, with the pick ($8.6M) given up; owners’ proposal $11.5M–$46.6M
Third base Isaac Paredes either way The acquisition happens in both branches; only where Gonzales plays depends on the answer.

The pick is a lottery ticket, not a sure asset: at #29–34 median 0.0 WAR, 52% at or below zero. Current CBA rules as Keystone reads them; not in our data, and the CBA that expires Dec 1, 2026 could change them. Brief →

What picks become

Expected control WAR by overall pick (line, 90% band shaded; pool era dashed) and share reaching MLB (dotted, right axis), log scale

04812160%50%100%#1#3#10#30#100#300Lowe compif <$50MAll picksOverall pick →Control WAR →

Dots along the bottom: Pittsburgh’s 2026 picks (listed below). Draft-to-debut lag, smoothed across picks: 2.8 years at #1, 3.1 years at #10, 4.0 years at #30, 4.3 years at #75, 4.6 years at #300. 164 picks of players who were drafted again later count for nothing (they didn’t sign). Neither the curve nor its dollar value rises with a later pick; the 90% band comes from resampling players.

Value vs. price

Present value of expected control WAR, net of the salaries paid in those seasons (solid, 90% band), vs. the 2026 slot (dashed), log scales

$1M$10M$100M#1#3#10#30#100#300Expected valueSlot

Value here is what the six control seasons are worth at Contract Studio’s $/WAR, minus what the club pays him in them (the minimum salary for three years, then arbitration), each weighted by the chance he reaches the majors. Even net of that pay, every pick is worth more than its slot on average: the bonus pool caps the price below the value. That gap is why clubs trade for Competitive Balance picks and fight over pool money.

By pick range

Drafts 2005–2016 by overall pick; slot = the 2026 price at those pick numbers. Pool era = 2012–16 classes (hard bonus pools)

PicksnControl WARReach MLB10+ WARAvg slotWAR per $1MPool era, per $1M ± 2 SE
Picks 1–10≈ 2026 Round 11207.8988%32%$8.4M0.940.68± 0.25
Picks 11–30≈ 2026 Round 12403.3074%12%$4.4M0.750.59± 0.23
Picks 31–75≈ 2026 Comp, Comp. Balance, Round 25391.7856%6%$1.9M0.920.81± 0.28
Picks 76–105≈ 2026 Round 33601.2046%3%$897K1.341.11± 0.52
Picks 106–140≈ 2026 Round 44210.8540%3%$630K1.351.63± 0.83
Picks 141–200≈ 2026 Rounds 5–67200.5635%1%$406K1.371.50± 0.65
Picks 201–320≈ 2026 Rounds 7–101,4400.4820%2%$228K2.121.30± 0.50

Pool era (2012–16 classes): the bands overlap within two standard errors, so no band is clearly the best buy per pool dollar. Before the pools (2005–11), clubs could buy over-slot talent late, so the all-era late-round ratios run high. A club can’t buy more late picks; how it splits its pool across its own picks is the lever (the 2026 table weighs it on the curve).

Backtest: fit on 2005–10 classes, scored on 2011–16 classes
PicksnPredictedActual± 2 SE
1–53010.197.063.12
6–10307.666.462.93
11–20603.834.161.54
21–35892.512.701.12
36–752401.821.430.48
76–1403901.030.940.31
141–2003600.600.660.30
201–3207200.580.350.12

Calibrated (within two standard errors) at picks 6–10, 11–20, 21–35, 36–75, 76–140, 141–200; overall the newer classes produced 85% of the predicted WAR. Six control seasons for 2011–16 classes include the 60-game 2020 season, and a few 2016 careers are still short, so part of any gap is not era.

Pittsburgh’s 2026 draft

Signing bonus vs. slot (MLB Stats API), each pick valued on the curve until he is graded

Player#SlotBonusvs. slotCurve valueTrade-pool valueBonus fits # (value there)
Derek CurielOF · Round 15$8.3M$6.2M−$2.1M$41.5M*pool era $24.1M$34.4M#11$31.4M (−$10.1M)
Aiden RuizSS · Round 244$2.3M$3.5M+$1.2M$8.9M$10.1M#27$13.2M (+$4.3M)
Chris Rembert2B · Supplemental: compensation for the unsigned 2025 Round 2 pick (#50)51$1.9M$2.4M+$459K$7.8M$8.7M#42$9.3M (+$1.5M)
Jason DeCaroP · Round 380$1.0M$1.3M+$262K$5.8M$7.6M#68$6.7M (+$843K)
Andruw GilesOF · Round 4108$726K$998K+$272K$3.9M$4.0M#82$5.7M (+$1.8M)
Ryan MarohnP · Round 5140$532K$532Kat slot$2.9M$2.1M#140$2.9M ($0)
Tyler FayP · Round 6169$404K$343K−$61K$2.5M$1.5M#189$2.3M (−$144K)
Bryson MooreP · Round 7198$317K$305K−$12K$2.3M$1.2M#203$2.3M (−$20K)
Alex OverbayP · Round 8228$252K$223K−$29K$2.2M*pool era $1.4M$723K#249$2.1M (−$59K)
Tre Phelps3B · Round 9258$215K$203K−$12K$2.1M*pool era $1.1M$320K#281$2.0M (−$68K)
Michael GibsonP · Round 10288$200K$18K−$182K$2.0M*pool era $931K$129Kbelow every slot
Spencer EvansP · Round 11318—$300K———
Rohan LettowP · Round 12348—not reported———
Griffin StiegP · Round 13378—$150K———
Damarcus Rideout-CarterP · Round 14408—not reported———
Liam O'LearyP · Round 15438—$150K———
Grant GovelP · Round 16468—not reported———
Nathan HelmanP · Round 17498—$25K———
Malachi WashingtonOF · Round 18528—not reported———
Andrew DuncanOF · Round 19558—not reported———
Dakota StoneP · Round 20588—$100K———

Pool $16.2M (the sum of Pittsburgh’s Round 1–10 slots; it made no Competitive Balance pick in 2026); $16.2M counted against it, $880K short of the 5% overage line. Rounds 1–10 bonuses plus any bonus above $150K after Round 10 count against the pool; the pool is the sum of the club's Round 1–10 slots (2026 data). Spending up to 5% over is taxed, beyond that costs picks (current CBA, Keystone's reading). If Pittsburgh traded its Competitive Balance pick, it was #34 (CB-A), worth $11.2M on the curve against a $2.9M slot: $8.3M given up net of the bonus. That is inferred from our data, not confirmed: Pittsburgh made no Competitive Balance pick in 2026 (it made one in 2023, 2024 and 2025); the Chicago White Sox made #34 (CB-A); on July 11, before Pittsburgh signed its first 2026 draftee (July 17), Pittsburgh sent them Jaden Woods and future considerations (for Brandon Eisert and Jacob Gonzalez). The data don't name the pick. After Round 10 there is no slot: bonuses up to $150K don’t count against the pool, and blank bonuses there aren’t reported in our data. “Bonus fits #” is the 2026 pick whose slot is closest to his bonus, a heuristic for where the club valued him, and the curve’s value there; a bonus more than 10% under the smallest 2026 slot fits no pick. Curve values are provisional until FanGraphs grades the 2026 class. Read that way, the 5 under-slot deals moved their players to lower picks’ prices (−$10.4M on the curve, −$10.1M of it Derek Curiel at the #11 price) and the 4 over-slot deals added +$8.4M: net −$2.0M, leaving out Michael Gibson (below every slot). It assumes bonus tracks consensus talent, which a club’s own read can beat. * Picks 1–5 and 201–320 sit where the backtest over-predicts (actual 69% and 60% of predicted): these curve values are on the high side, so the pool-era curve’s value is shown under each. Trade-pool value: the curve value times FanGraphs’ table-to-curve ratio near the pick on the graded 2025 class (×0.83 at #5: Derek Curiel $34.4M), the figure the Trade Builder and the roster use. International pool data for 2027 isn’t published yet.

Keystone is an independent portfolio project. It is not affiliated with Major League Baseball or any club. Data: MLB Stats API, Baseball Savant, FanGraphs. Used under their terms for individual, non-commercial use.